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Conflicting Identities and Social Pressure   








Over  the  last  half-century  female  employment  rates  have  increased  significantly  in  many 
countries. This change has partly been attributed to a change in gender norms. The purpose of 
this paper is to present a dynamic model within which the evolution of female labor supply can 
be analyzed. Drawing on psychological literature, we let individuals define themselves in terms of 
different social identities, each of which prescribes a certain type of behavior. These prescriptions 
may imply conflicting incentives which provide agents with a motive to continuously revise the 
importance  they  attach  to  a  given  identity.  Applying  this  approach  within  the  context  of  a 
dynamic model of labor supply, we are able to make some novel predictions about what may 
cause labor supply to change over time. Our results suggest that the fear of becoming an outsider 
in  society  may  have  prevented  a  complete  transition  of  women  from  housewives  to 
breadwinners. In addition, we show that the discrepancy between personal and social norms may 
have interesting implications for labor supply: an increase in the hours of work prescribed by a 
working norm need not necessarily lead to more hours of work. Finally, our analysis shows that 
not recognizing that the weights attached to different social identities are endogenous may imply 
that the long-run effects on labor supply of a higher wage may be underestimated. 
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1. Introduction 
What  may  cause  personal  norms,  or  preferences,  to  change  over  time  and  how  will  this 
influence the long-run supply of labor? To answer these questions, we believe that it is fruitful to 
borrow ideas from the psychology literature which emphasize that personal identities play a key 
role for understanding human behavior. In this paper, we try to incorporate such ideas within the 
context of a dynamic model for labor supply and we show how this can add to our understanding 
of how norms influence labor market participation in the long-run. In particular, we hypothesize 
that social interaction and conflicts between identities may play an important role in explaining 
the observed changes in women‟s participation on the labor market.  
Over  the  last  century,  the  prescribed  roles  of  men  and  women  in  society  have  changed 
dramatically. For example, World War II changed the world in many aspects, among those the 
labor market participation of women. In the United States, as elsewhere, the demand for male 
soldiers created an unprecedented demand for female labor. Although the end of the war implied 
a  return  of  the  male  labor  force,  the  trend  of  increasing  female  labor  market  participation 
persisted. At the end of World War II, the rate of female labor market participation (LFP) was 
still only 30 percent
1 whereas, today, this rate exceeds 70 percent. The same trend can be found 
in many other countries. For example, in Iceland and Sweden female LFP rates of 80 percent and 
higher have been recorded.
2 
Possible explanations for the increase in female employment rates are higher female wages, 
lower fertility rates and higher educational attainment among women.
3 However, these factors 
have only been partially successful in explaining the evolution of female employment rates.
4 
Instead, there is mounting evidence that changes in social norms are p otentially important for 
understanding these developments.
5 Data on gender attitudes and labor supply lend support to 
this hypothesis. Figure 1 below depicts the female share of labor supply in the OECD countries 
for which data were available in 1970 and 2005, and Table 1 shows the attitudes in 2002 among 
people in the same OECD countries towards a traditional male-only breadwinner norm.  
 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Schweitzer (1980). 
2 UN Gender Info 2007. 
3 See, for e.g., Killingsworth & Heckman (1986), and Goldin (1990). 
4 Neumark & Postlewaite (1998). 
5 See Golding (1990, 1994), Romme (1990), and van der Lippe and Siegers (1994).   3 
    
Figure 1: Female share of the labor force in OECD countries for which data was available in 1970. Source: OECD 
Labor Market Statistics. 
 
Table 1: Attitudes towards female and male labor market participation.  
 
 
Source: ISSP 2002.6 
 
                                                 











A man's job is to earn money; 
a woman's job is to look after the home and the family
Strongly agree or  Neither agree or Disagree or
agree disagree strongly disagree
Sweden 7.65 14.73 77.62
Norway 9.46 13.19 77.35
Finland 11.74 20.49 67.77
Netherlands 12.33 20.21 67.46
Denmark 13.57 9.61 76.83
France 17.88 13.2 68.92
Ireland 18.56 13.76 67.68
Germany 18.96 13.09 67.945
United Kingdom 19.77 18.31 61.92
New Zealand 19.81 17.73 62.47
Australia 21.63 22 56.36
Switzerland 23 18.03 58.96
United States 23.6 23.85 52.55
Spain 24.68 8.91 66.4
Austria 29.49 24.58 45.93
Portugal 30.59 11 58.41
Japan 30.88 20.59 48.52
Mexico 49.76 10.78 39.45  4 
As can be seen in Figure 1, large differences persist between countries: while the gap between 
female and male labor supply was almost eliminated in the Nordic countries in 2005, female labor 
supply remained below 40 % in Mexico and Italy. Similarly, Table 1 shows that a large majority in 
the Nordic countries rejects the traditional gender norm whereas a majority in Mexico supports 
it; the same countries that we find in the upper and lower ends in Figure 1. In Figure 2, we depict 
the  correlation between the  share of individuals disagreeing with the  traditional  breadwinner 
norm and the female share of employment in each country. As is clear from the figure, the 
correlation  between  norms  and  female  labor  supply  is  positive.  The  Pearson  correlation 
coefficient is .609 and significant (p = 0.009). 
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation between the share of respondents disagreeing with the statement “A man‟s job is to earn 
money; a woman‟s job is to look after the home and the family” and the female share of the labor force. Source: 
ISSP 2002 and OECD labor market statistics 
 
This correlation suggests that female LFP may be related to the prevailing norms in society 
and that a substantial increase in female LFP may be facilitated by a change towards more gender 
neutral social norms.
7 
In this paper, we present a model which aims to explain how the attitudes towards a gi ven 
norm may change over time. B efore discussing our approach, let us   first  briefly review the 
relevant literature. The role of social norms in economic behavior has a relatively  long history in 
                                                 
7 Admittedly, the relationship is not completely clear-cut. In Ireland and Spain, for example, large majorities disagree 
with the traditional breadwinner norm in spite of a relatively low female share of employment. However, note that if 
we consider the change in the female share of employment between 1970 and 2005, the relatively low level of female 
LFP in 2005 does not necessarily contradict the role of norms for LFP.   5 
economics.
8 The inclusion of social sanctions for norm violating behavior in economic models 
has enabled economists to explain seemingly irrational behavior such as the lack of underbidding 
of inefficiently high wages. However, social norm s in isolation cannot explain why costly 
behavior persists in the absence of surveillance or why people engage in sanctions of behavior 
that, at least at first glance, does not affect them personally.
9 In other words, social norms do not 
provide us with a comprehensive answer to why anonymous responses to questions of the kind 
in Table 1 differ substantially between countries, and we are still left with the question of what 
may cause norms to change over time.  
A potential answer to this question may be found by drawing on research in psychology on 
the interdependent relationship between social norms, identity and individuals‟ need to maintain a 
coherent and positive self-image.  Psychological  theories of personality  suggest that,  although 
most  individuals  perceive  themselves  to  have  a  coherent  overall  personal  identity,  they 
nonetheless define themselves in terms of a set of different identities related to the social groups to 
which they ascribe membership.
10 For example, if you were given the question, „Who are you?‟ 
your answer would most likely involve identities related to your gender, your nationality, your 
profession and perhaps your hobbies. Each of these identities is associated with both social and 
personal norms
11 in terms of prescribed characteristics, behavior and values.
12  
Both social and personal norms guide individual behavior via carrots and sticks. However, 
while compliance with social norms is driven by the fear of social sanctions or with the wish f or 
social rewards, compliance with personal norms is enforced by the fear of negative (guilt, shame, 
reduced self-esteem) or wish for positive (pride, enhanced self-esteem) self-evaluations.
13 Many of 
the prescriptions associated with different identities a re likely to be relatively compatible with 
each other. However, in some instances the different identities of an individual may present him 
or her with conflicting incentives. If the prescriptions associated with different valued identities 
are incompatible with each other, Cognitive Dissonance Theory
14 may offer a potential explanation to 
the evolution of both social and personal norms over time. According to this theory, and the 
related theory of Self-Affirmation
15, the perceived consistency of an individual‟s self-concept is 
fundamental for his or her mental well-being. These theories predict that a behavioral act that is 
                                                 
8 See e.g,. Akerlof (1980); Bernheim (1994); Lindbeck (1995, 1997) and Lindbeck et al. (1999). 
9 An example given in Elster (1989) is the presence of vengeance norms. The threat of vengeance is only credible if it 
is believed that the individual will follow through regardless if the expected benefit is positive or negative. 
10 See e.g., Abrams & Hogg (1990); Hogg & Terry (2000). 
11 A personal norm can be defined as an internalized rule prescribing values, beliefs and behaviors that are consistent 
with an individual‟s desired self-image (or self-concept) 
12 See e.g. Tajfel (1974); Turner (1991). 
13 Swartz (1977); Steele (1988); Kerr et al. (1997); Bamberg et al., (2007). 
14 Festinger (1957); Aronson (1968, 1992). 
15 Steele, (1988).   6 
inconsistent  with  an  individual‟s  self-image,  in  terms  of  violating  a  valued  personal  norm, 
questions the credibility of this self-image and therefore creates a sense of unease (i.e. cognitive 
dissonance). The sense of unease, in turn, creates incentives to restore consistency in terms of 
either changing the behavior or by degrading the value of that particular norm in the individual‟s 
overall identity.
16 
During the last decade, the roles of personal norms and identity for economic behavior have 
started to gain an increased interest among economists. In their seminal papers on the subject, 
Akerlof & Kranton (2000; 2002; 2005) show that if utility in part depends on whether an agent‟s 
behavior  is  consistent  or  not  with  the  social  norms  associated  with  a  valued  social  identity, 
deviant (both the agent‟s own and others) behavior will cause utility loss in terms of threatening 
the individual‟s sense of identity. Hence, individuals may both have incentives to punish deviant 
behavior that threatens this social identity and to act in a way that may differ from their internal 
preferences.
17 Akerlof & Kranton (2000; 2002; 2005) assume that individuals have primarily one 
identity and analyze behavior in a static model. In the short run, this is probably a reasonable 
assumption.  
However, using this approach we cannot explain the evolution of norms, or c hanges in 
attitudes, in the long run.
18 A few economists have therefore adopted a dynamic framework in 
order to study how people‟s need for a consistent and positive self-image (e.g. Vendrik, 2003; 
Bénabou & Tirole, 2006) and social group affiliation (e.g. Horst et. al., 2007) affect the formation 
of personal norms and social groups over time. By modeling the interdependent relationship 
between  identity  and  behavior,  these  papers  have  provided  important  insights  on  the 
internalization process of social norms and on changes in preferences over time.   
Horst  et  al.,  (2007)  analyze  how  individuals‟  strive  for  self-fulfillment  affect  the  dynamic 
evolution of personal and social identities. In their model, individuals may improve their self-
image by joining social groups and adopting the typical characteristics of these groups. However, 
since the group‟s characteristic depends on its members, groups are modified over time by the 
people joining them. This may induce individuals to revise their previous choices and eventually 
choose different groups.  
Bénabou & Tirole (2006), argue that individuals have incomplete information concerning their 
personal  values  and  beliefs,  and  that  they  therefore  use  past  behavior  as  signals  of  their 
characteristics.  Consequently,  individuals  may  invest  in  a  desired  self-image  by  acting  in 
accordance with the prescriptions of a valued social identity. Bénabou and Tirole‟s theoretical 
                                                 
16 See e.g., Cooper & Hogg (2002) 
17 See also, Oxoby ( 2004). 
18 See Davis ( 2006; 2007)  for a critique of the Akerlof and Kranton papers.    7 
analysis  suggests  that  investments  in  identity  increase  when  contradicting  information  on 
personal preferences is scarce, such as in tightly knitted social groups, or when contextual cues 
remind the individual of his or her desired identity.  
Finally, Vendrik (2003) analyzes how the costs and benefits, associated with complying and 
deviating from social and personal norms, affect both behavior and belief in norms over time. 
Vendrik shows that, if an individual‟s utility level in part depends on the level of consumption 
and in part depends on norm fulfillment, violation of a norm may cause complete norm erosion. 
The economic model is used to analyze the impact of a traditional household norm on married 
women‟s labor supply, and shows that an increase in the market wage for women may create a 
process where women make the full transition from housewives to career women due to the 
existence of cognitive dissonance. Vendrik argues that the erosion in the belief in the household 
norm may have played an important role in the long run increase in married women‟s labor 
supply in many OECD countries.  
In the model presented in this paper, we draw on some of the ideas developed by primarily 
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) and Vendrik (2003) in order to analyze the mechanisms underlying 
changes in time allocation between market labor and household production. In contrast to the 
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) and Vendrik (2003) papers, however, we suggest that it is not only 
the conflict between one personal and social norm that drive the evolution of behavior over time. 
Instead,  we  argue  that  the  presence  of  conflicting  identities  (or  norms)  may  hold  important 
information for explaining both the evolution of norms and behavior. The purpose of this paper 
is thus to analyze the role of conflicting identities by developing a dynamic model where the 
importance attached to a given norm is endogenous. In the analysis below, we focus on identities 
related to an individual‟s profession (e.g. making a career) and to the family (e.g. being a good 
father/husband, mother/wife). The potential conflict arises since the norms associated with these 
two identities potentially prescribe incompatible hours of work. We assume that if an agent acts 
in discordance with one of his/her personal norms, he/she will experience a sense of unease that 
creates an incentive to revise the importance of that norm and thereby of that identity in his/her 
overall self-image. This revision is assumed to be a relatively slow process and is formally treated 
as a disinvestment in the degree of importance attached to the norm in question. Analogously, 
when an agent´s actual choice of hours of work is in line with what is prescribed by one of 
his/her personal norms, the agent has an incentive to invest in the relative weight of that norm. 
This approach allows us to describe the time path of the weight attached to each norm which, in 
turn, also determines the long-run evolution of an agent‟s labor supply.   8 
The main contribution of the paper is that we, by explicitly incorporating how conflicting 
incentives related to different identities give rise to norm evolution, are able to explain both the 
transition of women from housewives to career women and the observed persistence of part-time 
labor of women. In addition, our theoretical approach enables us to explain differences between 
countries  concerning  both  women‟s  behavioral  conformity  and  personal  agreement  with 
traditional gender norms.  The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present the 
basic model for analyzing individual behavior in the presence of conflicting identities. In section 
3, we use the framework developed to analyze the effects of structural changes and in section 4 
we discuss these structural changes in terms of the evolution of female labor supply. The paper is 
concluded in section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Approach 
Consider  a  social  group  made  up  of  N  individuals.  Each  agent  derives  utility  from  the 
consumption of a numeraire good,  , as well as from the time spent not working,  . This time 
captures all the things an agent may do outside work such as taking care of children, doing 
household work etc. In the following we will refer to   as household time. If we let   denote total 
time available and   the hours of work, household time is given by  . The variables   and 
 define the standard part of the utility function. We assume that this part is quasi-linear and can be 
written  , where   is an increasing and concave function of  . 
2.1 Personal Norms 
Turning to the non-standard part of the utility function, we assume that the agent also derives 
utility from his/her set of social identities, each of which is being associated with a certain type of 
personal norm. In this model, the agent defines him/herself in terms of two social identities; a 
professional (work) identity and an identity related to the individual‟s role within a household 
(e.g. as a mother/father or husband/wife). The agent is assumed to have a mental picture which 
defines what it means to be successful w.r.t. each type of social identity. For example, an agent 
who works as a researcher may define success at work in terms of being able to publish in top 
journals whereas an agent who works as a lawyer may define success at work in terms of the 
number of court cases won. How successful the agent is in fulfilling his/her ambition is likely to 
depend  on  how  much  time  and  effort  he/she  puts  into  the  work.  Assume  that  the  agent 
perceives  that    is  the  amount  of  time  he/she  needs  to  spend  at  work  to  achieve  his/her 
professional goal. If the agent works less than  , not enough effort is put into the work to 
achieve the personal ambition whereas if he/she works more than  , the quality of the work is   9 
reduced (e.g. because of exhaustion). We will refer to   as the agent‟s personal working norm (or 
norm 1). The level of   is likely to depend on the job characteristics and on the characteristics of 
the individual. Since these characteristics are exogenous in our model, so will be the level of  . 
The agent also has a mental picture which prescribes how to behave in order to be a  good 
father/mother or husband/wife. Using a similar argument as above, let   be the amount of time 
the agent perceives that he/she must devote to the family to achieve success/high self-esteem in 
this dimension. This could, for example, involve not working at all when the kids are small, in 
which  case    hours  per  day,  or  it  could  involve  working  hard  when  the  children  are 
adolescent in order to serve as a role model in terms of diligence and responsible behavior. We 
will refer to   as the agent‟s personal household norm (or norm 2). Since the personal 
norms arise from two entirely different mental pictures,   and   need not coincide. If  , we 
say that the two personal norms are in conflict with each other.  If, on the other hand,  , 
then there is no conflict between the two mental pictures in which case the two personal norms 
collapse into one overall personal norm. 
The agent‟s well-being depends on how well he/she lives up to the mental picture associated 
with personal norm i = 1, 2 (if there is only one overall norm then i = 1). Let   be the utility 
associated with fulfilling norm i. It is given by 
 
 
  (1)   
 
where   is a nonnegative constant,   is the difference between the actual choice of hours of 
work and that prescribed by the personal norm, and   describes the relative importance, 
or weight, of identity i in the individual‟s set of social identities. If  , identity i is of no 
importance  for  the  agent,  bur  for  positive  values  of    the  agent  to  some  degree  identifies 
him/herself in terms of identity i. The larger   is, the stronger is this identification and thus the 
greater is the perceived importance of behaving in accordance with the norm associated with 
identity i. The functional form in equation (1) satisfies the following properties: 
 
(i)  When the agent fulfils the personal norm completely ( ), then the agent achieves 
maximum bliss,  .  
(ii)  The utility associated with fulfilling personal norm i will be positive also for small 
deviations around  .   10 
(iii)  If the agent deviates significantly from  , this questions the individual‟s self-image in 
terms  of  social  identity   and  the  sense  of  bliss  will  be  replaced  by  a  feeling  of 
frustration or guilt for not living up to the mental picture related to that identity. In 
this situation, the agent will experience cognitive dissonance,  . 
(iv)  The  specification  in  equation  (1)  implies  that  the  stronger  the  agent  identifies 
him/herself in terms of identity i, the larger will be the utility (or disutility) associated 
with fulfilling (or deviating from) the norm. 
 
Property (ii) states that an agent needs not live up to the norm perfectly in order to feel 
satisfaction. Almost fulfilling the personal norm will also give rise to bliss w.r.t. to the norm, 
albeit not as high as when  . On the other hand, there is a cut-off distance from   beyond 
which the feeling of bliss is replaced by guilt for not living up to the norm, as stated in property 
(iii). Observe also that when  , equation (1) reduces to  , which is a 
functional  form  used  in  earlier  literature  on  norms.
19  As such, the function al  form used in 
equation (1) can be viewed as a more general version of th e standard model. The motivation for 
using the formulation in equation (1) is that  in a dynamic framework where  an agent is able to 
change the relative importance,  , of social identity i over time (see below), it makes no sense 
investing in a given social identity if this behavior only gives rise to cognitive dissonance. 
Let us now turn our attention to the weights   and   that the agent attaches to identity i and 
a conflicting identity j (if it exists). These weights will be endogenous in the long-run and we 
assume that they have the following properties: 
 
(i)  If the agent attaches maximum weight to identity i ( ), then the weight attached 
to the conflicting identity j will approach zero ( ,) in which case  . 
(ii)  A2: An agent who does not attach maximum importance to identity i ( ) will 
attach some weight to a conflicting identity ( ) . 
(iii)  A3: The weights   and   are inversely related in the sense that the higher weight an 
agent attaches to identity i, the lower weight will he/she attach to the conflicting 
identity j. 
 
Property (i) is an assumption about consistency in the sense that if an agent only has one 
social identity, then his/her choice of l will be equal to what is prescribed by the personal norm 
                                                 
19 Observe also that much of the earlier literature on norms has been set within a static framework. In that context 
 will be constant and effectively redundant even when  .    11 
associated with that social identity. Given the specification in equation (1), the agent‟s choice of l 
will for certain coincide with   if   (see first-order condition 14 below). The underlying 
idea behind properties (ii) and (iii)is that the higher weight an agent attaches to a given social 
identity,  the  more  difficult  it  is  to  maintain  a  social  identity  with  conflicting  behavioral 
prescriptions.  In  terms  of  norms  1  and  2,  these  assumptions  imply  that    and    will  be 
inversely  related  in  the  sense  that  the  weight  attached  to  one  social  identity  cannot  change 
without the weight attached to the other, conflicting, identity changing in the opposite direction. 
This means that we can write   as a function of  ,  , where  . We will refer 




Figure 3a: The norm function.            Figure 3b: The norm function. 
 
As can be seen, we do not put any restrictions on the shape of the norm function except in the 
tails, where assumption (i) defined on the previous page implies that the norm function will 
ultimately be convex. 
2.2 Social Norms 
Let us now turn our attention to how the personal norms discussed above are related to the 
norms at the social level. Here the basic idea is that when an agent meets another person, the 
agent judges that person from  how  well  he/she lives up to the  agent‟s  personal  norms. To 
illustrate this, consider an agent j with a professional identity as a researcher in economics and 
who  believes  that  success  as  a  researcher  is  achieved  by  working  hard.  In  our  model,  this 
argument is represented by a personal working norm prescribing a relatively high number of 
work hours, e.g.,  = 10 hours of work per day. Now, since we assume that an individual‟s overall 
n2 n2
n1 n1  12 
personal  identity  may  be  constituted  by  different  social  identities  with  conflicting  behavioral 
prescriptions, the same agent may be convinced that  a responsible parent should only work half-
time when the kids are small. As such, the agent‟s personal household norm would in this case be 
given  by,  e.g.,  .  Assume  now  that  agent  j  is  acquainted  with  another  hard  working 
researcher who has small kids. In social settings where the professional identity is salient, such as 
the work place, agent j may complement the other person for working so hard. However, in 
other social settings the same agent may instead rebuke the other person for not fulfilling his/her 
role as a „good‟ father/mother. As such, the conflict between agent j‟s personal norms means that 
the other person will receive both appraisals and rebukes when he associates with the agent. If 
the agent attaches great importance to professional identity and a relatively low importance to the 
household norm, i.e.   is large whereas   is small, then the appraisals come more often than the 
rebukes. In this situation, the other person‟s net utility from the social contact with the agent will 
be positive. The opposite happens if it is   that is large. 
To capture these arguments formally, we will use a formulation which resembles that used in 
equation (1). As such, if the other person´s actual choice of hours of work is  , let us define 
 
 
  (2)   
 
to be the utility experienced by the other person in terms of appraisals/rebukes from agent j 
regarding norm i. The parameter where   is equal to one at the outset and will therefore be 
dropped  below.  The  functional  form  in  equation  (2)  satisfies  properties  similar  to  those  in 
equation (1): 
 
(i)  When the other person lives up to agent j‟s personal norm completely in the sense 
that  , then agent j gives maximum appraisal to the other person, that is 
. 
(ii)  When the deviation of   from   is small, then   which reflects that agent j will 
still give the other person appraisal but not as strongly and as frequently as in (i). 
(iii)  When  the  deviation  of    from    is  large,  then    which  reflects  that  the 
appraisals will be replaced by rebukes in which case the other person experiences a 
utility loss.   13 
(iv)  The larger   is, the more often will the appraisals/rebukes come and the larger will 
 be in absolute value. 
 
Properties (i) – (iv) capture that the more important agent j perceives social identity i to be, the 
more appraisal will the agent give to the other individual if  , and the more 
criticism  will  the  agent  give  if  .  Consequently,  the  level  of  utility  or 
disutility experienced by the other person when he/she associates with agent j will depend on the 
weight   that the agent attaches to social identity i. 
 
The arguments presented above imply that each agent will encounter the personal norms 
prescribed  by  the  other  persons  in  the  society.  The  utility  in  terms  of  appraisals/rebukes 
associated with norm i experienced by an agent moving around in this society made up of N 




(3)   
 
where   will be referred to as the social pressure, or alternatively, the social loss/gain associated with 
norm i, and the parameter   reflects the degree of social pressure. It is a nonnegative constant and 
if   is zero, the agent is is not subject to any social pressure. Observe that the formulation in 
equation (3) implies that there need not exist a unique social working norm and a unique social 
household norm. Instead, since the agent meets different people with different personal norms, 
he/she  will  receive  different  treatment  from  different  people  and  it  is  the  average  utility 
experience of these contacts that makes up the social pressure. 
Finally, for the analysis to be conducted below, let us also define the average socially prescribed 




(4)   
     
where   to begin with. As defined,   is a fixed parameter. 
 
2.3 Formulating the Agent‟s Intertemporal Maximization Problem   14 
The discussion above implies that an agent´s overall utility is a function of  , and  . The 
following quasi-linear instantaneous utility function will be used to represent these preferences: 
    (5)   
where    is  a  psychological  cost  function  to  be  defined  below.  At  time  zero,  the  agent‟s 




(6)   
where t denotes time,   is the instantaneous utility function defined in equation (5) and   is 
the discount rate. The agent has perfect foresight and supplies labor in return for the wage . 
If we let   denote the interest rate, the agent‟s budget constraint at time t can be written as: 
 
 
(7)   
where   is the saving and   is non-labor income.
 Although we do not explicitly consider 
households in this model, non-labor income may nevertheless be interpreted as a predetermined 
income transfer between spouses in a household. The time paths of   ,   and   are 
exogenous and we assume that in the long-run, these variables converge to fixed steady-state 
values  ,   and  , where “~” denotes a steady-state value. The price of good   is normalized to 
one and it is assumed that the initial endowment of capital is positive, i.e.  . 
 
Investment in a Social Identity 
Following Vendrik (2003), we assume that the agent treats   as exogenous in the short-run 
but that   may change over time. This intrapersonal process of the evolution of the relative 
importance of different social identities occurs because violating or living up to a personal norm 
will affect the individual‟s self-image. If the agent violates a personal norm associated with a given 
social identity, the agent has an incentive to downplay the importance of identity i in his/her 
overall identity by disinvesting in  . Similarly, if an individual lives up to his/her ideal self in 
terms of fulfilling a personal norm, this behavior confirms his/her identity in which case he/she 
has an incentive to reinforce the importance of that aspect of his/her overall identity by investing 
in  . In other words, to improve (or relieve) the bliss (or unease) of living up to (or violating) a 
norm, the agent will allow the relative weight of the social identity associated with that norm to   15 
increase (decrease). Although this is most likely a subconscious process, the change in   may 
nevertheless be viewed as the outcome of long-run optimization. As such, it will be incorporated 
into the agent‟s intertemporal maximization problem. 
In  line  with  Vendrik  (2003),
20  we assume that because of the existence of psychological 
adjustment costs, the  change in the weights treat   and   is a relatively slow process which 
takes place over time. As such, we can  treat   and   as state variables in which the agent can 
invest or disinvest. Since the weights are connected via the norm function  , we need only 
to consider the time path of   to fully characterize the evolution of these weights. As such, let   
denote the investment in  , which means that the evolution of   will be determined by the 
following differential equation: 
 
 
(8)   
Vendrik (2003) assumes that the psychological adjustment cost of investing/disinvesting in the 
belief  in  a  norm  is  captured  by  a  quadratic  cost  function   ,  where    is  a  positive 
constant. This psychological adjustment cost arises as a consequence of internal pressure. It reflects 
that re-evaluating a deep rooted idea is a slow process which requires some psychological effort. 
In addition to the internal pressure, we assume that the psychological adjustment cost is also 
subject to external pressure, or worrying. Here, the idea is that the more an agent invests in the 
working identity, the closer will be the agent‟s future choices of labor supply to  . However, if   
deviates from the working norms among other people in the society, an investment in   may 
lead to a future social loss in terms of less appraisals and more rebukes. In other words, by 
investing in a given identity, the agent risks becoming an outsider in a social group to which he or 
she ascribes membership. This recognition will induce an additional psychological cost today in 
terms of worrying over how other people will perceive the agent in the future and will restrain 
the agent from deviating “too much” from the norms observed in the society. We propose that 
the psychological cost,  , associated with the external pressure of investing in   should have the 
following basic characteristics: 
 
(i)  If   coincides the working norms among the other people in the society, then  . 
(ii)  The more   deviates from the working norms among other people in the society, the 
larger (in absolute value) will be  . 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that Vendrik models investment in the degree of belief in a single norm while we model the weight 
the individual attaches to a different social identities.    16 
(iii)  The larger   is, the larger (in absolute value) will be   because investing in   will 
reinforce the tendency to choose future labor supply close to  . 
(iv)  All else equal, the stronger the degree of social pressure associated with the working 
norm,   the larger (in absolute value) will be   because the potential social loss of 
deviating from the social norms is now larger. 
(v)  If   a reduction in   may lead to a social gain in the future in terms of more 
appraisals and less rebukes. Then the worrying is replaced by relief, implying that   
will be negative when   . 
 
A functional form for the external pressure associated with investing in   which satisfies the 
criteria laid out above is: 
    (9)   
where   is the average socially prescribed hours of work, defined in equation (4). Arguably, one 
could  use  more  elaborate  functional  forms  to  capture  this  cost
21  but  for our purposes,  the 
functional form  in (9) is sufficient. Observe also that condition (v) implies  that if the agent 
disinvests in  , then   will be  negative. This reflects the notion that disinvesting in   will 
reduce the tendency to deviate from    in the future which relieves the stress of  potentially 
becoming an outsider in the future. Another interpretation is that disinvesting in   is equivalent 
to devaluating the social group related to identity i. The smaller   is, the less important will the 
opinions of other members of that social group be, and thus the less will the agent care about 
future rebukes.  
The arguments presented above can also be applied to define a psychological cost function 
associated  with  external  pressure  related  to  the  household  norm.  Using  the  same  line  of 
argumentation  as  above,  and  observing  that  an  investment  in    is  equivalent  with  a 
disinvestment  in  ,  the  psychological  adjustment  cost  associated  with  the  external  pressure 
related to the investment in   can be written:
22 
                                                 
21 One alternative would be to make this cost an explicit function of all future utility losses generated by the future 
changes in labor supply induced by the change in  . However, this would make it very difficult to solve the resulting 
intertemporal maximization problem and we therefore do not choose that approach. 
22 Observe that since   and   are related via the norm function  , an investment in   by the amount   is 
equivalent to a disinvestment in   by the amount  . As such, one could argue that the psychological 
adjustment cost terms in equation (10) should be scaled by  . We will disregard from this potential 
complexity in the analysis.   17 
    (10)   
Adding   together with equations (9) and (10) allows us to write the total psychological 
cost as: 
 
  (11)   
This is the psychological cost function used in the definition of the instantaneous utility function, 
, presented in equation (5). 
2.4 Solving the Intertemporal Maximization Problem 
Substituting equation (11) into  , the problem facing the agent at time zero is to choose  ,   
and   so as to maximize the intertemporal objective function in equation (6) subject to equations 
(7) and (8), as well as subject to the initial conditions for   and  , and the terminal conditions 
  and  .  The  current-value  Hamiltonian  corresponding  this 
intertemporal maximization problem can be written as: 
    (12)   
where   and   are the co-state variables (or equivalently, the shadow prices) associated with 
equations (7) and (8). The necessary conditions for an optimal path become: 
 
     (13)   
     (14)   
     (15)   
     (16)   
     (17)   
     (18)   
     (19)   
   18 
Together with equations (7) and (8), these necessary conditions implicitly determine the time 
paths of  ,   and   (which are the variables of interest in this analysis). To characterize these 
dynamics, observe first that equation (13) implies  . This is a consequence of assuming that 
the utility function is additive and linear in consumption. Although this is a strong assumption in 
a dynamic framework,
23 it will facilitate the analysis below considerably since the time paths of  , 
  and    will be independent of the time paths of    and  .  As such, we will be able to 
characterize the dynamics of  ,   and   without having to be concerned with   and  . 
The labor supply decision is implicitly determined by equation (14). The first two terms on the 
right hand side (RHS) of that equation,  , will be referred to as standard terms  
because they capture the standard trade -off between consumption and leisure. The remaining 
non-standard terms appear as a consequence of the two norms. Equation (1 4) implicitly defines 




(20)   
 
It is straightforward to show that the labor supply is strictly increasing in the wage. This is a 
consequence of assuming that the agent has a quasi-linear utility function in which case the 
income effect is redundant and only the substitution effect of a higher wage remains. In addition, 
as long as   is situated in the interval  , labor supply will also be an increasing function 
of  . Finally, an increase in the amount of working time prescribed by the norms, either at the 
personal or at the social level, will have a positive effect on  .  
Turning to the dynamics of the system, observe first that equations (15) and (17) can be used 




(21)   
 
                                                 
23 Vendrik (2003) instead assumes that the agent can neither borrow, nor lend, between time periods. If we would 
choose that approach, it would not change any of the qualitative results to be derived below.   19 
By using that equation (20) implies that   is a function of  , equation (21) in combination 
with equation (8) defines a dynamic system which completely determines the evolution of   and 
. The dynamic properties of this system are summarized in Proposition 1; 
     20 
Proposition 1: The dynamic system characterized by equations (8) and (21) has the following properties; 
 
(i)  There exists at least one interior steady-state where   is nonzero and finite. 
(ii)  If only one steady-state exists, the   locus will intersect the   locus from 
above at that point and the steady-state will be saddle-point stable. 
(iii)  If multiple steady-states exist, the number of steady-states will be odd. Each odd-numbered steady-
state  will  be  saddle-point  stable  whereas  each  even-numbered  steady-state  will  be  an  unstable 
node/focus. In the latter types of steady-state(s) the    locus intersects the    
locus from below. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3 in the case when there exists only one, saddle-point 
stable steady-state. 
 
Figure 4: The saddle-point stable steady-state. 
 
It is important to recognize the fundamental reason for why the dynamic system is saddle-
point stable. This dynamic property arises as a consequence of the psychological costs associated 
with the external pressure discussed in section 2.4. This external pressure will provide the agent 
with an incentive to hold back his/her investment/disinvestment in   which, in turn, prevents   
from either exploding to infinity or converging to zero. As such, the external pressure will force 
the individual to a certain degree of conformity with the social group. The degree of conformity 
will depend on how strong social pressure the social group can exercise over the individual agent. 
Consequently, it is only when the external pressure is zero that the agent can freely choose how 
much to invest/disinvest in the two norms. From equations (9) and (10) we see that   
i1
dn1/dt=0 n1
di1/dt=0  21 
if (i)   or if (ii)   and  . To see how the agent behaves in this situation, consider 
Proposition 2 which summarizes the dynamics in this special case; 
Proposition 2: If (a) the degree of social pressure,  , changes from positive to zero or (b) if    becomes equal to 
 and   becomes equal to  , then the dynamic system characterized by equations (9) and (24) changes from 
being fundamentally saddle-point stable to becoming fundamentally unstable. The latter dynamic system has the 
following properties: 
 
(i)  There exists at least one interior steady-state where   is nonzero and finite. 
(ii)  If only one steady-state exists, the   locus will intersect the    locus from below at that 
point and the steady-state will be an unstable node/focus. 
(iii)  If multiple steady-states exist, the number of steady-states will be odd. Each odd-numbered steady-
state will be an unstable node/focus whereas each even-numbered steady-state will be saddle-point 
stable 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5 which shows that when either condition (a) or condition (b) is 
fulfilled, then the slope of the    locus, evaluated at the steady-state, changes from 
negative to positive. 
 
Figure 5: Dynamics in the absence of external pressure. 
 
The implication of Proposition 2 is that in the absence of external pressure, there is nothing 
restraining  the  agent  from  completely  investing/disinvesting  in  .  To  understand  the 
fundamental mechanism behind process, consider the following example. Assume that initially 
i1
dn1/dt=0 n1
di1/dt=0  22 
we observe   and  . In this situation, the agent has an incentive to invest in   and 
disinvest in  . This will cause the future choice of labor supply to increase and as long as 
,  the  future  choice  of  labor  supply  will  now  be  closer  to    than  to  .  As  a 
consequence,    will  increase  whereas    will  decrease.  Both  these  effects  will  reinforce  the 
incentive to invest in  . This process will continue until   is eroded to zero. The opposite 
happens if we instead observe that   holds initially. Consequently, the agent will (except in 
the special case when  ) end up in a corner solution with the identity solely defined in 
terms of one norm. 
However, since there are many examples from the real world where complete norm erosion is 
not  happening,  we  will  treat  the  outcome  described  in  Proposition  2  as  a  special  case.  The 
remaining part of the analysis will therefore be based on the assumption that an agent is in the 
saddle-point stable steady-state as defined in Proposition 1. 
 
3. Structural Changes 
As mentioned in the introduction, some of the key factors explaining the development of 
female  labor  supply  are  higher  wages  and  changed  norms.  In  this  section,  we  will  use  the 
framework developed in this paper to analyze how these factors influence   and   in the long-
run. As such, we will focus on the following questions: 
 
(i)  What are the long-run effects of a higher wage on labor supply when the weights   
and   are endogenous? 
(ii)  What are the effects of a change in the personal working norm,  ? 
(iii)  What  are  the  effects  of  a  change  in  the  social  working  norm,  here  captured  by 
changing the parameter  ? 
 
The  effects  of these  structural changes  will  be  evaluated  conditional  on that the  agent is 
initially in the saddle-point stable steady-state depicted in Figure 3. Since   at that 
point, the steady-state levels of labor supply,  , and the weight attached to the working norm,  , 
are uniquely determined by the first-order condition for labor (equation 14) and equation (21). 
The latter equation is evaluated when   and for the reader‟s convenience, we state 









(23)   
Differentiating equations (22) and (23) w.r.t. l,  ,  ,   and   produces 
 
 












For  the  analysis  below,  note  that  that  saddle-point  stability  will  imply,  as  we  show  in  the 
Appendix, that   and  . 
To facilitate the analysis, it is helpful to illustrate the comparative static results to be derived 
below graphically. To do this, observe that both equation (22) and equation (23) implicitly defines 
a relationship between   and  . Beginning with equation (22), it is the first-order condition for   24 
labor supply and as such, it shows what level of   the agent will choose conditional on  . We will 
refer to this as the Short-run relationship between Labor supply and the weight attached to the 
personal working Norm, or the SLN function. The slope of this function is given by 
 
 
(25)   
As long as the labor supply is situated in the interval  , the term   will be positive 
in which case the SLN function has a positive slope in   space. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: The SLN and LLN functions when  . 
 
To interpret equation (23), observe that from equations (9) and (10), it follows that the terms 
in  the  first  row  of  equation  (23)  correspond  to  .  In  addition,  the 
definition in equation (1) implies that the terms in the second row of equation (23) correspond to 
.  Substituting  these  definitions  into  equation  (23),  multiplying  the 




(26)   
This expression has a straightforward interpretation. The first term on the left-hand side is the 
marginal benefit (MB) for the agent of an increase in  , evaluated in steady-state (where  ). 
To see this, observe that the expression inside the left parenthesis is the instantaneous marginal 







~  25 
Multiplying this term by  , we obtain the discounted present value, in utility terms, of the 
increase in   from today (time zero) to infinity. Hence since   is constant, it follows that 
 
 
(27)   
Turning to the second term on the left-hand side of equation (26), it is the marginal utility cost 
(MUC) that would arise if the agent were to make an additional investment in   at   (i.e. 
). This means that equation (26), which implies  , can be interpreted as 
a  condition  which  defines  the  optimal  level  of    in  steady-state.  As  such,  the  relationship 
between   and   implied by equation (26), and hence also implied by equation (23), gives the 
combinations of   and   which correspond to an optimal long-run investment in the weight 
attached to the working norm. Therefore, this relationship between   and   will be referred to as 
the  Long-run  relationship  between  Labor  supply  and  the  weight  attached  to  the  personal 
working Norm, or the LLN function. Differentiating equation (23), we obtain the slope of the 




(28)   
 
For  , the LLN function will be positively sloped in   space. 
The saddle-point stable steady-state defined in Proposition 1 corresponds to the point in 
 space where the SLN and the LLN functions intersect. In the Appendix we show that the 
properties arising from saddle-point stability imply that in a neighborhood of the saddle-point 
stable steady-state, the slope of the LLN function will be larger in absolute value than the slope 
of  the SLN function. When both functions have positive slopes, this implies that the  LLN 
function crosses the SLN function from below as illustrated in Figure 6. 
   After these preliminaries, we now have a suitable framework within which to analyze the 
effects of the structural changes mentioned above, and we begin by addressing the long-run 
effects of an increase in the wage. 
3.1 An Increase in the Wage 
The effects of a higher wage are illustrated in Figure 7 and we will base the interpretations on the 
assumption that labor supply is situated in the interval  .   26 
 
Figure 7: Effects of a higher wage. 
 
Initially,  the  agent  is  in  the  saddle-point  stable  steady-state  at  point  A.  If  the  wage  now 
increases, the SLN function will shift upwards. This reflects a standard labor supply response; 
conditional on the level of  , the direct effect of   on   is unambiguously positive when the 
agent has a utility function which is quasi-linear in income. This short-run effect on labor supply 
is readily obtained by differentiating equation (22) w. r. t.   and  , and in terms of Figure 7 the 
short-run labor supply response corresponds to the vertical distance between points A and B. 
However, this is not the end of the story. A consequence of this initial labor supply response is 
that the agent is now closer to fulfilling the personal working norm,  , and further away from 
fulfilling the personal household norm,   (recall that   initially). As such, the utility 
associated with fulfilling the working norm,  , has now increased whereas the utility associated 
with fulfilling the household norm,  , has been reduced. This creates an incentive for the agent 
to revise the self-images associated with the two norms. To reinforce the sense of bliss associated 
with  being  able  to  conform  better  w.  r.  t.  the  personal  working  norm,  and  to  relieve  the 
frustration of not being able to conform so well w. r. t. the personal household norm, the agent 
will start to invest in   and disinvest in  . This investment in the agent‟s professional identity 
also increases the perceived importance to fulfill the working norm and will induce the agent to 
increase the labor supply further in subsequent time periods, a process which continues until the 
new saddle-point stable steady-state, point C, is reached. This additional long-run effect on labor 
supply, which is the vertical distance between B and C, is a norm induced effect of a higher wage. 
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Proposition 3: Consider an increase in the wage when  . This will have a positive short-run effect on 
labor supply. The long-run effects on the weight attached to the working norm and on labor supply are given by 
 
 
  (29)   
 
 
(30)   
 
The long-run effect on labor supply will exceed the short-run effect. 
 
The last part of Proposition 3 is formally proved in the Appendix. 
3.2 An Increase in the Personal Working Norm   
Let us now consider the effects of an increase in the ideal hours of work prescribed by the 
personal working norm. These effects are illustrated in Figures 8a and 8b, and we will base the 
interpretations on the assumption that labor supply is in the interval  .  
 
 
        Figure 8a: Effects of an increase in  .            Figure 8b: Effects of an increase in  . 
 
The short-run effect of an increase in   is to shift the SLN function upwards. This reflects 
that if more hours of work are prescribed by the personal working norm, the agent will respond 
to this by increasing the supply of labor. However, in contrast to when the wage increases, this 
structural change also induces a shift in the LLN function (except in a special case). This reflects 
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to  the  working  norm.  An  increase  in    will  affect  the  incentive  to  invest  in    via  two 
mechanisms, one affecting the marginal benefit (MB) of investing in   and another affecting the 
marginal utility cost (MUC) of investing in  . The first effect arises because when   increases, 
the difference   will also increase (recall that   initially). This implies that it will now be 
more difficult than before to live up to the personal working norm which will have a direct 
negative  effect  on  the  marginal  benefit  of  investing  in    via  the  term 
. As a consequence, the long-run incentive to invest in   will be reduced and this 
will work in the direction of shifting the LLN function to the left. The size of this shift depends 




(31)   
 
As such, the closer the actual level of labor supply is to the personal working norm, the smaller 
will this effect be. 
Second, an increase in   will also influence the long-run marginal utility cost of investing 
in  .  This  effect works  via  the  term    which  is  one  component 
making up MUC. If MUC increases (decreases), the incentive to invest in   will be reduced 
(improved). All else equal, this will shift the LLN function to the left (right).  The size of this 




(32)   
As can be seen in equation (32), MUC will increase (decrease) if   initially exceeds (falls short 
of) the average social working norm,  , because in this situation an increase in   will exacerbate 




(33)   
 
The LLN function will shift to the left (right) if this expression is negative (positive). The LLN 
function remains unchanged if equation (30) is equal to zero. As such, the long-run effects of an   29 
increase in   will depend on the „initial‟ levels of  ,   and   because this will determine the signs 
of   and   on the RHS of equation (33).  These „initial‟ levels can, in turn, be 
related to the different situations facing a woman on the labor market depending on whether she 
lives in a society where the traditional male-only breadwinner norm is predominant or not. Let 
us, therefore, first consider a society where a majority in the population supports the traditional 
male-only  breadwinner  norm  which  requires  men  to  do  much  of  the  market  work  whereas 
women are primarily expected to take care of the household. In terms of our model this means 
that the average social working norm for men,  , is relatively large whereas the average social 
working norm for women,  , is relatively small . The superindices “ ” and “ ” refer to men 
and women, respectively. 
Now, consider a woman, who has internalized the male-only breadwinner norm and who lives 
up to it, that is   (e.g.,   2 hours of market work per day). For this woman, the 
expression  on  the  RHS  of  equation  (33)  is  close  to  zero  which  means  that  if  the  woman‟s 
personal working norm increases, the shift in the LLN function will be small. If the shift in the 
LLN function is negligible, Figure 7 in section 3.1 can be used to illustrate the long-run outcome 
in this situation. After the initial shift of the SLN function, the woman is at point B where she 
has an incentive to invest in  . This is a process which will continue until point C is reached 
where both labor supply and the weight attached to the personal working norm have increased.  
The outcome will be quite different for a woman who does not believe in the traditional male-
only  breadwinner  norm  but  who  wants  to  be  a  breadwinner  herself  by  working  full  time. 
Whether this woman‟s actual choice of hours of work will be close to   or to close   depends 
how strong the social pressure is. We will focus on the, arguably, realistic situation where the 
social pressure in the traditional society is sufficiently strong so as to force the woman to choose 
her hours of work in line with what is prescribed by the social norm, that is  . This means 
that initially, the woman deviates significantly from her personal working norm ( = e.g., 8 
hours of market work per day) in which case she is likely to experience cognitive dissonance w. r. 
t. the personal working norm. If   increases in this situation, this will reinforce the cognitive 
dissonance associated with the personal working norm. To relieve the increased stress of not 
being able to live up to this norm, the woman will disinvest in the weight she attaches to her 
professional identity. As a consequence, her supply of labor will start to decrease and in the new 
steady-state, both   and   will be lower than at their respective initial levels. To illustrate this 
graphically, observe first that at the initial position where   and  , the RHS of 
equation (33) will be negative and relatively large in absolute value (especially if the parameter 
capturing social pressure,  , is large). In this situation, the increase in   will produce a large   30 
inward shift of the LLN function, as illustrated in Figure 8a, where the long-run outcome is point 
C where both labor supply and the weight attached to the working norm are reduced. Observe in 
particular the sharp contrast between the short-run response on labor supply (point B) and the 
long-run effect for the woman (point C). The short-run effect is positive (given by the vertical 
distance between points A and B in Figure 8a) whereas the long-run norm induced effect is 
negative (given by the vertical distance between points A and C). Note also that the long-run 
effect on labor supply will be radically different for this woman with a „modern‟ personal working 
norm  compared  to  the  woman  discussed  previously  who  has  a  traditional  personal  working 
norm. This result suggests that for „modern‟ women living in „traditional‟ societies, it may be 
optimal to conform to the prevailing social norms, both in terms of behavior, but also internally 
in terms of downplaying the divergent aspect of their personality.  
Finally, let us consider a woman violating the social working norm in a „modern‟ society where 
the traditional male-only breadwinner norm has been replaced by a social working norm which 
requires women to do the same amount of market work as men, i.e. working full-time ( ). 
Here, we assume that the woman at hand does not believe in this „modern‟ working norm but 
instead has a personal working norm which requires her to work less, say half-time ( ). 
However, assume that the social pressure is sufficiently strong so as to force her to conform with 
the social working norm, that is she will work approximately full-time ( ). Note that, 
in this case we can no longer guarantee that the slope of the LLN and SLN function is positive. 
However, let us assume that this is the case.
24 If   and  , this implies that 
the RHS of equation (33) is positive.  In this situation, an increase in   will shift the LLN locus 
to the right, as illustrated in Figure 8b, in which case the new steady-state is at point C where both 
 and   have increased. To explain this, note that an increase in   from a position where 
 and   hold initially will, on one hand make it easier to conform with the personal 
working norm and on the other hand reduce the psychological cost associated with the external 
pressure. Both effects stimulate the woman to invest in  , a process which continues until point 
C is reached. 
Let us summarize the comparative static properties of an increase in the personal working 
norm by applying Cramer‟s rule in equation (24) to derive the following results; 
 
Proposition 4: Consider an increase in the personal working norm,  . The long-run effects on the weight 
attached to the working norm and on labor supply are given by 
                                                 
24 If   then the sign of   is no longer unambiguous. If    both the SLN and the LLN curve 
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(35)   
 
3.3 An Increase in the Social Working Norm 
The analysis above has indicated that the average social working norm plays a key role for the 
long-run development of labor supply and the weight attached to the personal working norm. Let 
us, therefore, conclude by analyzing the effects of a change in the social attitudes towards market 
work. As before, we base the interpretations on the assumption that labor supply is in the interval 
.  
Within the context of this model, a change in the social attitudes towards market work is 
captured by changing the parameter   in equations (22) and (23). An increase in  , from 
,  captures  a  simultaneous  increase  in  the  personal  working  norm    among  the  N 
individuals in the society.
25 This will influence an agent‟s decision both in the short-run, shifting 
the SLN function, and in the long-run, shifting the LLN function. The direct short-run effect 
arises because if more hours of work are prescribed by the social working norm, the agent will 
respond to this by increasing his/her supply of labor. This will cause an upward shift of the SLN 
function. 
The LLN function will shift because the increase in   will have a positive effect on   (see 
equation 4) which, in turn affects MUC via the term  . The direct 
effect on MUC is given by 
 
 
(36)   
If   initially, MUC will decrease which will shift the LLN function to the right. Figure 8b 
in section 3.2 can be used to illustrate the long-run outcome in this situation. If, on the other 
hand,   initially, MUC will increase and this will shift the LLN function to the left. Figure 8a 
                                                 
25 Of course, one can also envisage that the personal working norm increases within a fraction of the population in 
the society but as long as this fraction is not infinitesimally small in relation to N, the effects will produce effects that 
are qualitatively identical to the effects derived in this section.   32 
in section 3.2 can serve as an illustration for this scenario. Finally, if   initially, MUC is not 
affected and the LLN function will be unchanged. 
Now, consider a woman who lives in a society where the traditional male-only breadwinner 
norm is strong but who herself does not believe in this norm. Instead, her personal norm   is 
larger than the average working norm prescribed by the society,  , that is  . For this 
woman,  the  RHS  of  equation  (36)  will  be  negative.  In  this  situation,  her  psychological  cost 
associated  with the external  pressure  will decrease  when   increases because  the  difference 
between her personal working norm,  , and the average working norm in society,  , is now 
lower. This will cause an outward shift of the LLN function, as illustrated in Figure 8b, which 
causes both labor supply and the weight attached to the personal working norm to increase in the 
long-run. 
In  contrast,  for  an  agent  with  traditional  beliefs  living  in  a  relatively  „modern‟  society  an 
increase in   may actually backfire in terms of reducing both labor supply and the relative 
weight  of  the  working  norm.  In  other  words,  if  the  discrepancy  between  society‟s  and  the 
individual‟s values becomes substantial, this traditional individual may become reactionary. To see 
this,  note  that in  this case    initially and when    increases, so does the  discrepancy 
between the agent‟s personal norm and society‟s expectations. Although social pressure initially 
creates incentives to conform by increasing labor supply, the individual in will the long-run have 
incentives to devalue the importance of the social group promoting this social norm. Hence, in 
the long-run, for such an individual, an increase in   may actually reduce labor supply.     
We summarize the comparative static properties of an increase in the social working norm by 
applying Cramer‟s rule in equation (24) to derive the following results; 
 
Proposition 5: Consider an increase in  . The long-run effects on the weight attached to the working norm 




(37)   
 
 
(38)   
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4. Analysis of the evolution of female labor supply 
The model presented in this paper offers an interesting framework for analyzing the changes 
in female labor supply that has taken place in the era after the World Wars. In addition, our 
results offer a potential explanation to the persisting differences in, and attitudes towards, female 
LFP between countries and to women‟s domination of part-time labor. Let us therefore linger 
around the implications of the model.  
Consider first the effects of the absence of male labor during the World Wars. This structural 
change clearly implied that society‟s need for female labor increased and therefore potentially that 
the social norms related to female market work became more positive. The results summarized in 
proposition 5 suggest that if society at large became more accepting towards female market work, 
this may have affected female labor supply both in the short- and long-run. In the short-run, 
women with personal aspirations to be something more than a housewife became freer to choose 
market work over household work. However, if these women initially also defined themselves in 
terms of their role as mothers/wives to some extent, the increase in LFP may have had a negative 
side effect in terms of guilt of not being a „good‟ housemother. Consequently, working women 
may have felt inclined to downplay the relative importance of living up to the „household‟ norm 
for a positive self-image, and this in turn may have increased incentives to pursue a career. Note 
also that, since an increase in the socially prescribed hours of market work for women reduces 
the perceived future social cost of being a female breadwinner, the change in social norms may 
have facilitated the transition. It is also interesting to note that the relatively high growth in GDP, 
that took place during the post war era, may have amplified the effect. Proposition 3 suggests 
that, if this growth in GDP was reflected in higher wages for market work, we should expect 
female labor supply to increase in the short-run but also an enforced effect in the long-run due to 
an increase in the perceived importance of being successful at work for having a positive self-
image.   
Now, for women with no or small aspirations to have a career outside of the households, the 
model predicts that short-run effects of the war-induced structural changes should have been the 
same as for women with professional aspirations. However, the long run effects are expected to 
have differed. For these women, an increase in the socially prescribed hours of market work and 
in  the  wage  increases  incentives  to  supply  work  in  the  short-run.  However,  although  this 
behavior  is likely to have  created incentives to upgrade the  importance  of being a „working 
woman‟, the divergence between these women‟s personal prescriptions and society‟s expectations 
may have created a sense of not living up to the expectations at the labor market (a failure as a   34 
professional) and therefore to have created incentives to downplay the importance of pursuing a 
career. Indeed, the presence of conflicting identities and expected future costs of diverging too 
much from society‟s expectations imply that, if society did not change completely after the World 
Wars,  so  that  women  were  expected  to  completely  abandon  their  responsibility  within  the 
household,  we  may  expect  that  the  role  as  mothers/wives  may  have  persisted  as  having  a 
significant share in  women‟s identities and therefore  that women‟s participation in  the  labor 
market will continue to be part-time for a relatively large share of the population.  
Let us also briefly discuss the implications of Proposition 4. The results presented in equations 
(34)  and  (35)  suggest  that,  although  the  differences  in  personal  preferences  for  market  and 
household work are likely to be as high within countries as they are between countries, we may 
expect to observe a homogenization of attitudes within countries over time. This is so because 
women  with  „high  ambitions‟  in  societies  where  social  norms  still  prescribe  a  traditional 
distribution of work may find it optimal to adjust to these norms, both in behavior but also in the 
long run by downplaying the importance of making a career for their overall self-image. Even if 
their  personal  aspirations  to  have  a  career  are  initially  relatively  high,  the  fear  of  being  and 
becoming an outsider in society may provide these women with incentives to upgrade the relative 
importance of being a „good‟ housemother. Hence, the overrepresentation of women who agree 
with the traditional gender norm in some countries presented in Table 1, may not be so surprising: 
it is simply a consequence of our need to maintain mental peace and a positive self-image.  
5. Summary and implications for future research 
Drawing on ideas from psychology, which emphasizes that individuals define themselves in 
terms of a set of different identities, we have formulated a model that relates the importance an 
individual attaches to different personal identities to his/her long-run supply of labor. A key 
assumption is that different identities may prescribe different types of behavior, in which case the 
identities are in conflict with each other. This will provide an agent with an incentive to revise the 
importance he/she attaches to the different identities in the long-run. Applying this approach to 
a model of female labor supply, the potential conflict between identities is between a traditional 
household norm prescribing little (possibly zero) hours of work and a working norm which 
prescribes the woman to work, say, full-time. The main results are that (i) the long-run effects of 
a higher wage on labor supply may be underestimated if we do not recognize that the weights 
attached  to  different  social  identities  are  endogenous,  (ii)  an  increase  in  the  hours  of  work 
prescribed by a woman‟s personal working norm need not necessarily lead to an increase in her   35 
supply of labor in the long-run, and (iii) a change towards more gender-neural social norms 
facilitates  the  transition  of  women  with  professional  aspirations  from  housewives  to 
breadwinners.   
This paper may serve as a stepping stone for further research in the area of personal and social 
norms. Since the model presented in this paper deals with behavior at the individual level, the 
natural next step is to use this framework to analyze how the interaction between agents at the 
individual level sum up and determine the social pressure associated with a given norm. By doing 
this, one would be able to endogenize the weights attached to the different social identities at the 
social level. This would enable an analysis of how the interaction between agents drives  the 
importance of different norms in the long-run. Another issue for future research would be to 
endogenize the behavior prescribed by the personal norms. By doing this, it would be possible to 
analyze how the importance of norms and the defined behavior of these norms simultaneously 
change over time. The latter is interesting because the definition of the breadwinner seems to 
change over time and between countries. 
 
Appendix 
The   locus 
To derive the equation for the   locus, observe first that necessary conditions (15) 
and (17) are written as 





Next, differentiate (A.1) w.r.t. time and rearrange 
 
 
(A.3)   36 
If we now use (A.1) and (A.3) to substitute for   and   in (A.2), and use that  , 
we obtain equation (21) in the text. 
 
Proof of Existence of Steady-State 







By  using  that  equation  (20)  implies  ,  it  follows  that  the    locus  defines  a 
relationship between   and  . Let us now evaluate the RHS of equation (A.4) as  . First,  
since   it follows that the first term on the RHS of (A.4) approaches  ; a 
finite value. Second, the properties of the norm function specified in section 2.1 implies  
 
  (A.5) 
which means that the second term on the RHS of (A.4) approaches zero. Third, since the first 
term inside square brackets in the second row of equation (A.4) approaches infinity whereas the 
second term inside square brackets approach zero as  , it follows that the RHS of equation 
(A.4) approaches   as    which, in turn, implies that  . This means that the 
 locus will eventually be situated below the horizontal axis in ( ) space as  . 
It is not possible to evaluate the sign of the RHS  of equation (A.4) as   because the 
second term on the RHS approaches   whereas the second term inside square brackets in the 
second  row  of  equation  (A.4)  approaches  .  To  overcome  this  problem,  we  instead 
reformulate the maximization problem in terms of investing in   instead of   which means that 
the agent now chooses    instead of   and the norm function is now written  . This 
problem is equivalent to the problem formulated in the paper. If we follow the same procedures 
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Again using that equation (20) implies  , it follows that the   locus defines a 
relationship between   and  . Let us now evaluate the RHS of equation (A.6) as  . First, 
the properties of the norm function specified in section 2.1 implies  
 
  (A.7) 
which  means  that  the  first  term  on  the  RHS  of  (A.6)  approaches  zero.  Second, 
, which implies that the second term on the RHS of (A.6) approaches 
; a finite value. Third, since the first term inside square brackets in the second row of 
equation (A.6) approaches zero whereas the second term inside square brackets approach infinity 
as  , it follows that the RHS of equation (A.6) approaches   as   which, in turn, 
implies that  . Now, since a disinvestment in   is equivalent with an investment in  , it 
follows that   and   will always have opposite signs. Hence, since   corresponds to 
, and   corresponds to  , it follows that the   locus will eventually 
be situated above the horizontal axis in ( ) space as  . 
To sum up, since   as  , and since   as  , there must exists one 
point where the   locus crosses the horizontal axis in ( ) space. Since the horizontal 
axis corresponds to the   locus, that point will be a steady-state. If only one steady-
state exists, the   locus will cross the horizontal axis from above. If multiple steady-
states exist, their numbers must be odd and each odd-numbered steady-state will be saddle-point 
stable because each time the   locus crosses the horizontal axis from above, the steady-
state will be saddle-point stable. This is proved next. 
 
Saddle-Point Stability 
To prove that when the   locus crosses the horizontal axis from above, the steady is 
saddle-point stable, let us first observe that the dynamic system is characterized by equations (21) 
and (8). The dynamic Jacobian,  , corresponding to this system is written 
 
  (A.8) 
where  








Now, observe that the slope of the   locus in ( ) space is given by 
 
 
  (A.11) 
When the   locus crosses the horizontal axis from above, in which case the   
locus has a negative slope in steady-state, equation (A.11) implies that  . From 
(A.10) it then follows that  . This means that   and  , and the discriminant 
 is positive. Hence, the conditions for local saddle-point stability are satisfied. 
If, instead, the   locus crosses the horizontal axis from below, it follows that the 
linearized system around the steady-state will have positive characteristic roots, implying that the 
steady-state it is either an unstable node or a focus. 
Observe also that since   in the saddle-point-stabe steady-state, equation (A.9) 
in turn implies that  . In addition, since   and  , then 
 can only hold if  . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When either  , or   and  , the   in (A.4) reduces to 
 
  (A.12) 
Let us again use that equation (20) implies   and evaluate the RHS of equation (A.12) as 
.  First,    which  means  that  the  first  term  on  the  RHS  of  (A.12) 
approaches  ;  a  finite  positive  value.  Second,  the  properties  of  the  norm  function 
specified in section 2.1 implies  
 
  (A.13)   39 
which means that the second term on the RHS of (A.12) approaches zero. Hence, the RHS of 
equation (A.12) approaches   as   which, in turn, implies that  . This 
means that the   locus will eventually be situated above the horizontal axis in ( ) 
space as  . 
Next, let us evaluate the RHS of equation (A.12) as  . First, as  , the first term 
on the RHS of (A.12) will converge to  , which is a finite number. Second,  
 which means that the term inside the second square bracket on the RHS of 
(A.12) approaches  ; a finite positive value. Third, the properties of the norm function 
specified in section 2.1 implies 
 
  (A.14) 
which means that the second term on the RHS of (A.12) approaches minus infinity. Hence, this 
last term will dominate and the RHS of equation (A.12) will approach minus infinity as   
which, in turn, implies that  . This means that the   locus will eventually be 
situated below the horizontal axis in ( ) space as  . 
Hence, since the   locus will be situated below the horizontal axis when   but 
above the horizontal axis as  . Hence, there exists at least one point where the   
locus crosses the horizontal axis from below and this is a steady-state. From (A.10) and (A.11) it 
follows that when the   locus has a positive slope, the determinant of the dynamic 
Jacobian,  . Then, since that  , the characteristic roots are either two positive real 
numbers or complex roots with a positive real part. In either case, the system will be unstable. 
 
Proof that the LLN function is steeper than the SLN function 
The difference in slopes between the LLN function and the SLN function is given by 
 
  (A.15) 
where we have used that   as long as  , and that  . Since 
both the LLN function and the SLN function has a positive slope as long as  , the 
inequality in (A.15) implies that the LLN function is steeper than the SLN function. 
 
Proof that the long-run effect on labor supply of an increase in w exceeds the short-run effect   40 
The short-run effect of an increased in w on l is obtained by differentiating the first-order 
condition for labor supply, equation (22), w.r.t. w and l. This produces 
 
  (A.16) 
The long-run effect is given in equation (30) and restated here 
 
  (A.17) 
To show that the long-run effect exceeds the short-run effect, observe first that the inverse 
effects are given by 
 
  (A.18) 
 
 
  (A.19) 
This implies 
 
  (A.20) 
The inequality in (A.20) must imply 
 
  (A.21) 
Hence, the long-run effect on labor supply exceeds the short-run effect. 
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